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In the UK the main focus of welfare reform, and especially active labour-market
policies, has recently switched from those claiming unemployment benefits towards
the larger group of working-age people receiving sickness and disability benefits
(`incapacity benefits' in common UK parlance). Despite a gradual decline in the
numbers claiming since 2003, there remain more than 2.5 million people of working
age dependent on such incapacity benefits (IBs) in the UK.
(1)
The UK is not alone in
facing a serious `IB problem'. Social democratic welfare states such as Sweden and
Denmark have reported similarly high rates of IB dependency (Kemp, 2006), and even
the liberal United States, despite its limited spending on welfare benefits, saw a rapid
growth in `social security disability' during much of the 1990s and 2000s (Autor and
Duggan, 2006).
Policy makers in such diverse welfare states share a concern over the implications
of large numbers of people of working age claiming IBs. Beyond the fiscal pressures
placed on welfare budgets, there is substantial evidence that long periods out of work
can contribute to poor health (Waddell et al, 2007) as well as increasing the risk of
poverty (Kemp and Davidson, 2009). From a labour-market perspective, high levels
of economic inactivity restrict the supply of human capital, so that skills and experi-
ence become unavailable to potential employers (Beatty et al, 2009). In addition, and
perhaps crucially, longer term population ageing has raised concerns around the need
for more citizens to be economically active, and active for longer, by managing health
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Abstract. In the UK, as in some other EU states, the focus of recent welfare reforms has switched
from those on unemployment benefits to those receiving sickness/incapacity benefits (IBs), reflecting
concerns around the large numbers falling into the this last group. The Labour government elected
in 1997 introduced a range of measures to activate those on IBs, setting a target of a one million
reduction in the number of claimants by the end of 2015. The Conservative Party similarly came to
acknowledge that high levels of IB claiming represented a problem of `unemployment hidden as
sickness', and in coalition now proposes even more aggressive supply-side strategies. This paper
provides an extensive review of the most recent evidence to identify factors driving the rise in the
number of people claiming IBs and, in light of this analysis, assesses whether current policy is fit for
purpose. An important conclusion is that any national `one-size fits all' supply-side policy response is
blind to the distinctive geography of receipt of IBs and the complex combination of factors that leave
some people trapped on these benefits.
doi:10.1068/a43442
(1)
Throughout this article `IB' and `IBs' are used as generic terms to cover the previous main
`incapacity benefits': Incapacity Benefit, Income Support, claimed by people of working age with
health problems; Severe Disablement Allowance; and the new Employment and Support Allowance,
introduced from 2008.
conditions (Loretto et al, 2007). For these and other reasons, as we will see below,
reducing the numbers claiming IBs remains a priority for policy makers across welfare
states, including the UK.
Yet despite a plethora of welfare reforms and proposed initiatives, UK policy
makers have arguably failed to acknowledge and respond to the complex combination
of factors that has produced high levels of IB claiming concentrated within certain
groups and communities (Houston and Lindsay, 2010). This paper contributes to this
debate by providing an extensive review of new evidence to address two key questions:
. To what extent can the rise in the number of people claiming IBs be seen as a
problem of: (a) labour markets; (b) employability; (c) health; and/or (d) policy
failure?
. What measures are therefore required to reduce the number of IB claimants?
Following this introduction, we briefly discuss the current policy context in the UK.
We then address our two key questions, first by assessing the evidence on the combina-
tion of labour-market, employability, health, and policy factors that explain why large
numbers of people claim IBs. In addressing our second question we consider what
might work in reducing the numbers of IB claimants. We conclude by returning to the
UK policy agenda to assess whether current strategies are fit for purpose to address
the issues raised in the preceding discussion.
2 Welfare reform in the UK and targeting `one million off IB'
The numbers claiming what was then `Invalidity Benefit' rose steadily during the late
1970s and 1980s from well below one million (Holmes et al, 1991). There followed a
sharp rise in IB claiming in the early ^mid-1990s, and the numbers on these benefits
continued to grow, plateauing in the early 2000s at 2.7 millionösome 7% of the
working-age populationöbefore declining slightly since 2003 to 2.5 million in 2008
(Beatty et al, 2009).
For the Labour government elected in 1997, the main explanations for the large
number of people claiming IBs lay in boom-and-bust economic cycles that left some
lower skilled workers detached from the labour market, along with the manner in
which these benefits were more generous and involved less compulsion than the UK's
main unemployment benefitöcurrently Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA). Crucially, the
Labour government saw the `bust' putting people on IB, but the boom not taking
people off due to erosion in their employability and motivation which occurred while
they were on `passive' benefits (DWP, 2006)öso the initial problem lay with the labour
market, but the solution lay in the activation of individuals (DWP, 2008).
This thinking was influenced first by a welfare-reform agenda that sought to place
more emphasis on personal `responsibilities' over `rights', based on the assumption that
the welfare state must not produce `dependency' (Dwyer, 1998), and second by a belief
in supply-side labour-market policies designed to increase individual employability.
These are hegemonic discourses in government that define most citizens as paid work-
ers (Cole, 2008) and individualise social problems (Holmqvist, 2009), but that take
little account of: evidence that unemployed people with fewest qualifications actually
express the greatest desire to work (Dunn, 2010); possible adverse impacts for health
and families of substituting dependency on state benefits for dependency on jobs at the
bottom end of the labour market (Crisp et al, 2009); and the difficulties of increasing
labour supply in demand-deficient local economies (Houston, 2005).
A number of discourses surround the rationale for activation policies in general,
and the IB-reform agenda is no exception. So ideas around a `dependency culture'
are mixed with a more progressive social inclusion discourse based on the assumption
that work is beneficial for health and wellbeing and that claimants need support and
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encouragement in order to make the transition to employment. In addition, there is an
underlying discourseöless often explicitly articulated in social policy circles than in
economic onesöthat emphasises the need to maintain labour supply in order to meet
the needs of employers and to restrain wage inflation. While claimants have been
perceived as dependent on state benefits and, as a result, have lost the work ethic,
government has not extended responsibilities to employers to accommodate workers
with poor health, or indeed to the government itself to manage the economy and
regulate the labour market in ways to encourage the provision of stable, secure employ-
ment and to spread jobs growth to all regions, preferring instead to promote `flexible'
labour markets thought to be required to enhance growth and competitiveness.
This conflation of discourses informed a range of measures introduced from 2000
to activate claimants of IBs, culminating in a pledge to reduce the numbers on these
benefits by one million by the end of 2015 (DWP, 2008). The cornerstones of the then
Labour government's reform programme were the introduction of Pathways to Work
(PtW) as the main active labour-market programme targeting people on IBs and, in
2008, the replacement of Incapacity Benefit with a new Employment and Support
Allowance (ESA). PtW offers a range of services to IB claimants to assist them
back into employment, ranging from personal adviser support to other employability
provision (known as `Choices' services) and health-focused c`ondition-management'
programmes'. PtW initially represented only a minor increase in the compulsion faced
by those on IBs, but the introduction of the ESA has substantially altered the level of
conditionality and will demand work-related activity from a much broader population
of claimants. Since October 2008 new claimants of sickness benefits have been
allocated to one of two groups within the ESA: the Work-Related Activity Group
(WRAG), who are judged to be able to do some work now or in the future; or the
Support Group (SG), who are judged to be long-term sick/disabled. Members of
the WRAG are mandated to attend work-focused interviews after which a programme
of activity will be put in place involving, for example, retraining or participation in
PtW provision. The majority of successful ESA claimants are placed in the WRAG,
with benefits paid at a lower rate. During the first thirteen weeks of any claim, benefits
are paid at an even lower `assessment rate' (equivalent to the JSA). In short, the ESA
reform has reduced benefit rates for all but the sickest claimants while increasing
conditionality (Grover and Piggott, 2010).
(2)
The coalition government which came to power in 2010 has promised further
radical reform to benefits and services directed towards those with health-related and
other barriers to work. The 2010 White Paper Universal Credit: Welfare that Works
argues for a one-year time limit on contributions-based ESA for those in the WRAG
(DWP, 2010a). After this period, claimants will be directed towards income-based
benefits. Consequently, as under the JSA regime, long-term claimants with savings or
a working partner are unlikely to be able to access benefits. As was made clear in the
coalition's October 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, these changes to entitlement
have been designed to deliver substantial savings to the exchequer (HM Treasury,
2010). These savings will be achieved by considerably increasing the reach of means
testing within the IB system and imposing a lower rate of income-based benefit
(or withdrawing payments completely) from long-term claimants. Such changes
will inevitably increase the risk of poverty faced by already-vulnerable IB claimants.
(2)
ESA weekly rates in 2010: a single person in the Support Groupö»95.15 or up to »108.55;
a single person in the Work-related Activity Groupöup to »89.80; a single person aged 25 years
and over during assessment phaseöup to »64.30 Those in the Work-related Activity Group can be
subject to sanctions (up to the value of the work-related activity componentö»24.00) if the
customer does not engage in the conditionality requirements without good reason.
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More generally, reducing the disposable income of claimants may also further undermine
the potential for economic recovery in isolated labour markets where a substantial
proportion of local consumers' spending power reflects the benefits that they receive.
The ESA reform also established a new Work Capability Assessment (WCA), which
makes the medical criteria which need to be met in order to qualify for benefits more
stringent. Initial figures for the new WCA found that between October 2008 and
August 2009, only 10% of claimants were assessed as suitable for the ESA Support
Group, and 22% for the WRAG, the majority were assessed as fit for work and
transferred to JSA.
(3)
The Labour government was committed to reassessing all exist-
ing IB recipients under the WCA by 2013, and the 2010 coalition administration has
called for even more immediate action. A review led by an eminent occupational
health specialist has accepted the logic of an early assessment of claimants designed
to provide `` a first positive step towards work'', but has also criticised a lack of empathy
and transparency in theWCA process, and suggests that an overreliance on `mechanistic'
medical assessment has led to `` poor decision-making'' (Harrington, 2010, page 9). The
coalition government has accepted these findings and promises greater autonomy for
Jobcentre Plus staff making future decisions on access to ESA, alongside improvements to
the transparency and communication of WCA outcomes (DWP, 2010b).
3 The nature of the `IB problem'
3.1 A labour-market problem?
During the late 1990s and 2000s the numbers claiming IBs remained relatively high, and
very high in some local labour markets, despite historically buoyant levels of employment
at the national level. Yet policy makers took the view that `` a lack of jobs is not the
problem'' (HM Treasury, 2003, page 22). Rather, the Labour government elected in 1997,
and its coalition successor, have shared a view of the IB problem as being largely
explained by a lack of employability, motivation, and skills among some individuals.
This is despite a powerful body of evidence on the link between labour-market
effects and IB claiming that has grown since an analysis of 1981 ^ 91 Census data Green
(1995) noted the blurring of boundaries between unemployment and economic inactiv-
ity in depressed regions, and Beatty and Fothergill (1994; 1996) described the diversion
of redundant mine workers to IBs following the mass mine closures of the 1980s. Beatty
et al (2000; 2009; 2010) have argued that economic restructuring and job destruction
are crucial in explaining the concentration of IB claiming in some labour markets,
where there have been fewer opportunities available, and where those with health
problems and other barriers have been pushed to the back of the jobs queue. Such
processes have resulted in persistently high levels of IB claiming in depressed urban
labour markets (Webster, 2005), seaside towns (Beatty and Fothergill, 2004), ex-coal-
fields (Beatty and Fothergill, 1996; 2005), and some rural areas (Beatty and Fothergill,
1997). MacKay and Davies's (2008) analysis of long-term trends suggests that increases
in nonemployment (and IB claiming as a key element of these trends) clearly demon-
strate the impact of the recessions of post-1973, the early 1980s, and the early 1990s. In
addition, the scarcity of job opportunities has been identified as key barrier to work by
claimants themselves in disadvantaged urban labour markets (Green and Shuttleworth,
2010).
The theory advanced, developed, and demonstrated over more than a decade
by Beatty et al (2000; 2009; 2010)öthat geographical concentrations of high IB
claiming actually reflect labour market disadvantage and `unemployment hidden as
(3)
Department for Work and Pensions: Employment and Support Allowance, Work Capability
Assessment Statistical Release October 2009 at http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/workingage/
esa wca/esa wca 13102009.pdf
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sickness'öcan therefore point to a substantial and growing evidence base. Others have
pointed to the apparent accuracy of the so-called `MacKay's law':
‘‘the greater the degree of labour market disadvantage, the less appropriate is
unemployment as a measure of labour market slack'' (MacKay, 1999, page 1933),
because workers in labour markets with few opportunities are more likely to move
into categories of economic inactivity such as `permanently sick/disabled', while their
counterparts in areas exhibiting higher demand remain defined as `unemployed'.
Consistent with the view that the demand for labour is a crucial determinant of
levels of IB claiming, the small reductions in IB claiming in the 2000s came towards the
end of the UK's `long boom', only after JSA levels had reached historically low levels in
former industrial areas. In other words, only once employment growth in these areas
had eroded the stock of younger, healthier JSA claimants down to very low levels did
IB claimants stand much chance of securing jobs. Furthermore, the recent reduction in
the stock of IB claimants has been the result more of decreased on-flow to these
benefits than of increased off-flow (Webster et al, 2010). This suggests that the buoy-
ancy of local labour markets influences the likelihood of an individual claiming IB
when they become ill and/or lose a job more than it stimulates existing IB claimants to
search for worköagain questioning the efficacy of supply-side policies.
An important question arises as to whether the new ESA regime can be understood
in the same terms as historical claiming of Incapacity Benefit. Given the central
importance of the geography of labour markets in understanding the nature of the
IB `problem', we have conducted a new analysis comparing the geographies of claim
rates of ESA and Incapacity Benefit. Our analysis of newly released data on the district
of residence of claimants of the new benefit suggests that the geography of the ESA
replicates that of existing Incapacity Benefit claimants in older industrial areas
(figures 1 and 2). The correlation at local authority level between Incapacity Benefit
and ESA claim rates is remarkably strong (0.942). This indicates that enduring labour-
market disadvantage in these areas is feeding through to new benefit claims, despite
significant changes to the medical grounds on which claimants qualify under ESA.
In other words, the processes producing ESA claims appear to be, by and large, the
same as those which produced Incapacity Benefit claims, as evidenced by the almost
identical geography of claim rates.
The map of Incapacity Benefit claim rates (figure 1) corresponds to areas of former
industrial declineöin particular, former coal mining areas in Central Scotland, South
Wales, Northeast England, and the Midlands, and older industrial towns and cities in
the north and west. There are only small pockets in the south: in inner London, where
employment in warehousing and distribution has declined, and in the former coalmining
towns of Kent.
The map of ESA claim rates (figure 2) replicates that for Incapacity Benefit, with
significant concentrations in older industrial Britain. The large-scale decline of heavy
industry with mass redundancies in the 1980s and early 1990s was over by the time the
ESAwas introduced in 2008, so why does the ESA map replicate the IB map so closely?
Sluggish economic growth and concentrations of poor health in former industrial areas
combine to reproduce enduring high levels of economic inactivity. Accumulated labour
surpluses are transmitted through labour-market sorting, from the skilled manual male
workers initially losing their jobs to affect those least able to compete for jobsöin
particular those in poor health, with few skills, and, increasingly, women as well as
men (Beatty et al, 2009), and young as well as older workers (OECD, 2010). Further-
more, the introduction of the ESA in 2008 for new claimants coincided with the onset
of recession in the UK economy, with industrial areas being hardest hit (LGA, 2008).
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Figure 1. Incapacity Benefit and Severe Disablement Allowance claimant rates by local authority
area, February 2010.
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Figure 2. Employment and Support Allowance claimant rates by local authority area, February
2010.
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Consequently, it is not difficult to understand why the geography of ESA claim rates
corresponds so closely to that of Incapacity Benefit claim rates. ESA claim rates are
closely related to shortfalls in labour demand, just as was the case with Incapacity
Benefit.
In conclusion, the weight and range of evidence is such that we can say that it is
simply a fact that labour-market changes (and especially the long-term impacts of area-
specific industrial decline and job destruction) are essential to explaining the rise in,
and continuing high levels of, IB in some parts of the UK. Just as `jobs deficits' in local
areas have been shown to be key to understanding the disadvantage faced by some
minority ethnic groups (Simpson et al, 2009), so the geography of labour markets is
vital to an understanding of the IB problem. Those who seek to explain the IB problem
in terms of an apocryphal dependency culture or other individual failings, without
reference to the geography of labour markets, either misunderstand or misrepresent
the nature of the problem. Nor is it tenable to challenge people on IBs to find their way
into work without acknowledging that employers are often reluctant to provide oppor-
tunities or make adjustments. The labour market and workplace provide the vital
contexts within which the nature of the IB problem is defined. That said, there is
also clear evidence that individual health and employability factors help to explain the
increased risk of long-term IB claiming among some people.We now turn to these issues.
3.2 An employability problem?
We noted above that labour-market change has seen some regions and localities shed
jobs that would otherwise be accessible for people who, instead, end up on IBs. But the
evidence suggests that individuals' characteristics also matter, if only in explaining why
some people rather than others are at greater risk of finding themselves on IB. Major
survey exercises with long-term IB claimants have found that they are more likely to:
be relatively low-skilled (including gaps in literacy and numeracy); have few qualifica-
tions; have work records with long periods of unemployment or incapacity; have
generally worked in low-paid jobs and peripheral sectors; reside in social housing
and/or disadvantaged neighbourhoods; report fewer social networks linked to people
in work; and have neither access to transport nor a driving licence (Beatty and
Fothergill, 2002; Beatty et al, 2010; Green and Shuttleworth, 2010; Hudson et al, 2009;
Kemp and Davidson, 2009; Little, 2007; McVicar, 2008; Shuttleworth et al, 2005). These
problems are significant predictors of claiming IB, and are associated with reduced
chances of reentering employment (Little, 2007; Kemp and Davidson, 2010).
Additional barriers may be specific to particular claimants within the IB popula-
tion. For example, some IB claimants, and especially women with children, may have
complex caring responsibilities (Beatty et al, 2009; Kemp and Davidson, 2009).
Meanwhile, the relatively older profile of the IB-claimant group means that many
face additional problems linked to age discrimination (MacKay and Davies, 2008).
Older IB claimants may also be more likely to doubt their own capacity to return to
worköthey are less likely to look for work while claiming benefits and less likely
to leave IB to reenter work than their younger counterparts (Little, 2007).
However, there is no consistent evidence of a dependency culture among IB claim-
ants: those claiming IBs tend to demonstrate no abnormally negative attitudes towards
work in general (Beatty and Fothergill, 2002). While fewer than one-in-twenty IB
claimants are actively searching for work at any point in time, a further one-in-four
would like to work, and many others express a strong latent desire to work which
is short-circuited by health, disability, or other barriers (Beatty et al, 2010). Kemp
and Davidson (2010) demonstrated that levels of work commitment are not linked to
the likelihood of an individual moving from IB into employment. Beatty et al (2010)
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specifically sought to test for a dependency culture among IB claimants, but found
little evidence of prior knowledge of the benefits system or `learned dependency'.
The evidence suggests that IB claiming is concentrated in certain localities and
regions because that is where there are fewest job opportunities. However, it is also
clear that in these areas certain individuals find themselves at the back of the jobs
queueöthe last in line in the competition for those decent jobs that are available.
Within this context, it is some of the lowest skilled, least qualified, and most vulnerable
individuals who tend to gravitate towards IB. So in explaining why some individuals are
at even greater risk within already disadvantaged labour markets, we can understand
the IB problem as partly an employability problem. In contrast, there is no consistent
evidence that a culture of welfare dependency explains why the most disadvantaged
struggle to escape long-term IB claiming.
3.3 A health problem?
One source of interest in the IB problem is the paradox between apparently better
health in the general population and the increasing numbers on health-related benefits.
The UK General Household Survey indicates that the proportion of the working-age
population reporting health problems or disability has remained stable at around 15%
(Beatty et al, 2010). Furthermore, in their work on the `real level of unemployment'
Beatty et al (1997; 2007) used control measures for differences in ill health among the
general population to demonstrate that the major regional concentrations in IB claiming
cannot be understood as a function of the geography of health.
However, this does not give policy makers the licence to identify benefit cheating or
dependency culture as the root of the IB problem. Indeed, it is important to remember
that in their seminal theory on worklessness, Beatty et al (2000) did not merely identify
`hidden unemployment' as a component of rising IB numbers, but also that `hidden
sickness' plays a key role: that is, those who claim IBs tend to have experienced ill
health while in work, and it is merely that there are fewer opportunities to cope with
sickness in the workplace (and fewer jobs in general) in depressed labour markets.
Beatty et al (2000; 2009) argue that long-term sickness is widespread throughout the
labour market, among those coping in the workplace, the unemployed, and those
claiming IBs. In `full employment' labour markets, people with health conditions are
more likely to sustain their employment, whereas in depressed labour markets people
with similar ill health face an increased risk of labour-market exclusion:
‘‘they are among the first to be made redundant; they may well be offered incentives
to leave employment; [and] they have difficulty in competing in labour markets that
suffer from over-supply'' (MacKay and Davies, 2008, page 468).
There is a substantial evidence base regarding the real health problems faced by IB
claimants. Surveys have consistently found that IB claimants tend to have left their
previous employment due to sickness, and see health problems as a key barrier to work
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2002; 2005; Beatty et al, 2010; Green and Shuttleworth, 2010).
Shuttleworth et al (2005) found that newly redundant workers with health problems
were less likely to search for work than their healthier counterparts. Analyses of
longitudinal data (for example, from the British Household Panel Survey) demonstrate
a consistent relationship between the severity of self-reported health problems and
labour market/benefits status (Jones et al, 2010). Clinical professionals dealing with
the IB group report their clients as experiencing a range of health problems, with even
those in the `mild to moderate' group initially targeted by the PtW programme often
needing intensive and continuing support (Ford and Plowright, 2008; Lindsay et al,
2007). Kemp and Davidson (2010) have also demonstrated that the number and range
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of health conditions reported by IB claimants is an important predictor of their chances
of returning to work.
There is some evidence of complex differences in the health barriers faced by IB
claimants, according to age (Brown et al, 2007); gender (Kemp and Davidson, 2009);
and geography (Anyadike-Danes, 2010). Although there is a need for further research on
differences in how health problems are experienced and reported by specific claimant
groups, there is no evidence of a widespread increase in the number of people falsely
reporting health problems (Beatty and Fothergill, 2005). The weight of evidence from
research both with claimants and with clinicians points to a range of health problems
limiting the work capabilities of people on IBs, demonstrating `` the fallacy of the idea
that there are large numbers of people claiming IBs who are `faking' health problems.
The reality is that many claimants face complex health and employability-related barriers
to work'' (Lindsay and Dutton, 2010, page 260).
3.4 A problem of policy failure?
The idea that there is an IB problem that requires a policy response is no longer
controversial. However, for some time policy makers were reluctant to concede this
point. There is evidence of successive policy changes in the 1980s `encouraging' the
signposting of unemployed people with health problems towards IBs, and thus divert-
ing them from unemployment benefits (NAO, 1989). Such practices apparently
remained commonplace during much of the early 1990s (Webster, 2002). For MacKay
and Davies (2008), the stricter benefit regime introduced by the Conservatives in
1986, and the subsequent tightening and rebranding of Unemployment Benefit as
JSA in 1996 (along with the relatively low payment rates and increasingly prevalent
means testing associated with these reforms), inevitably encouraged people to claim IBs.
In depressed labour markets with fewer job opportunities, claiming IB became a rela-
tively attractive option. IB claimants had genuine health problems, but may otherwise
have claimed `active' benefits:
‘‘the headline figures for IB conflate two groupsöthose whose health problems are
so severe that they would remain on sickness benefits in all circumstances and
those who would have been able to work if suitable jobs had been available''
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2005, page 844).
With the introduction of the PtW programme and eventually ESA to replace
existing benefits, the Labour government to some extent acknowledged the compelling
evidence that high levels of IB claiming in fact partly represented unemployment
hidden as sickness. Similarly, by 2008 the Conservative Party in opposition had come
to acknowledge that attempts to ``hide unemployment in the sickness register'' were
counterproductive (Cameron, 2008). The belated conversion of both of the UK's main
political parties to engaging with the evidence on how labour markets help to define
the IB problem is welcome. However, there remains limited progress on policies
that fully acknowledge how the geography of labour-market disadvantage frames the
exclusion of some people with health conditions. Instead, successive governments
have favoured ``a nationwide, supply-side strategy'' in response to the IB problem
(Little, 2009, page 877).
This supply-side strategy has been based on a familiar two-strand approach:
employability-focused activation (through programmes like PtW); and reforming access
to the benefits system. It is worth considering the emerging evidence on the impact
of these measures. Early evaluations of PtW identified some employment effects
among those making an initial inquiry about the programme, but it has been noted
that the decline in IB claiming in many areas of the UK during the 2000s was part
of a trend that predated PtW (Webster et al, 2010). Rather, the effects of the long
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boom began to reach IB claimants from 2001 onwards and some chose to return to
work as a result. Longer term evaluations have not found statistically significant impacts
on employment outcomes associated with PtW (Bewley et al, 2009; NAO, 2010).
Workplace and employer factors also have the potential to play a key role in the
successful reintegration of people previously claiming IBs. Limited in-work adviser
services under PtW have demonstrated their potential to help some returners to cope
with the emotional and social challenges of fitting into the workplace (Dixon and
Warrender, 2008). However, in-work support remains relatively underused. That said,
the last years of the previous Labour government saw an attempt to strengthen
workplace support for people with health problems before they are forced to claim IBs.
Fit for Work pilots were established in response to the government-commissioned
`Black Review ' (Department of Health, 2008) to provide personalised back-to-work
support to sickness absentees. As yet, there is no evaluation evidence as to the impact
of these initiatives.
Policy failure has clearly contributed to the UK's IB problem. For Fothergill (2010,
page 4) policy makers
‘‘missed a golden opportunity to bring down IB numbers a lot further during the
latter stages of the long economic boom... initiatives for IB claimants lacked
penetration into the potential client group and never really provided the intensive
and sustained support, including physical and/or mental rehabilitation, that many
IB claimants require in order to re-engage with the labour market.''
More recent initiatives under the PtW programme have delivered health and
employability benefits for some participants, but there is little evidence that they have
had a significant employment impact independent of the effects of strong labour
demand up to 2008. Programmes like PtW have inevitably struggled to meet their
job-entry targets since then, as the recession and its aftermath have limited opportu-
nities for those seeking to return to work (NAO, 2010). That on-flows to ESA have not
increased substantially can be put down to the stringency of the WCA process, which
now assesses the vast majority as `fit for work'. However, there remain concerns that
services are not in place to ensure that all vulnerable claimants get the health and
employability-focused support that they need, and that such services are not linked to
a labour-market policy that acknowledges the impact of economic restructuring and
area-based disadvantage on opportunities to work.
Such concerns have not been assuaged by the change of government. Coalition
policy documents reveal a narrow (mis)understanding of the IB problem and broader
worklessness. Initial discussion documents identified two (and only two) `key problems'
with welfare and employment services: that the benefits system is too complex; and
that it does not sufficiently incentivise work (DWP, 2010c). The general principle of
long-term reforms that will simplify the benefits system and allow more generous
`disregarded' earnings (that claimants working a few hours can keep without deductions
from benefits) has won broad support (DWP, 2010a). However, at the time of writing
there remains a lack of detail on how a single, universal income-based credit will be
administered, and how ill health and other disadvantages will be evaluated and sup-
port allocated accordingly. A lack of detailed policy information therefore precludes
further evaluation of the potential impacts of Universal Credit.
More worryingly, the unerring focus of coalition reforms on individuals' behav-
iouröand on the need for policies `` to generate positive behavioural effects'' (DWP,
2010c, page 10)öreflects an analysis that places the blame for worklessness solely on
individuals' characteristics and choices. The logical conclusion of such an analysis is
the need for increased conditionality and compulsion on benefit claimants. Accord-
ingly, proposed reforms promise to demand more compulsory activity of most ESA
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WRAG members by way of `work preparation', while also imposing strengthened
sanctionsöincluding the complete removal of benefits from those failing to participate
in work-related activity (it is also suggested that benefits should continue to be withheld
for one to four weeks from sanctioned claimants after they reengage with activity,
presumably as some sort of additional punitive measure) (DWP, 2010a). Even more
vulnerable ESA lone parents with nursery-age children will also be subject to sanctions
if they fail to attend work-focused interviews (although in this case there will be a
maximum 40% deduction in benefits).
Of course, we noted above that supply-side measures are required given the
complex combination of health and employability barriers faced by many on IBs.
The simplified `` single Work Programme for everyone who is unemployed, including
people claiming incapacity benefits'' (Conservative Party, 2010, page 15) proposed by
the coalition is to be defined by a greater say for local stakeholders and Jobcentre Plus
managers in targeting services, but there is little evidence as yet that the new pro-
gramme will improve the quality and range of services available to people experiencing
multiple disadvantages.
Coalition proposals do not mention the role of labour-market demand in shaping
flows on and off IBs, and severe reductions in the budget for regional economic policy
(and the abolition of Regional Development Agencies) suggest that there will be an
even greater reliance on a one-size fits all, supply-side strategy in future (HM Treasury,
2010). Furthermore, if we are right that labour-market inequalities and the dynamics of
demand are key to understanding the IB problem, then the coalition government's
emphasis on deficit reduction over continuing macro-economic stimulus is likely to
be counterproductive. People claiming IBs during the first half of the 2010s will need
to compete in labour markets populated by many more employable redundant private
and public sector workers. Furthermore, cuts to public sector funding will inevitably
accentuate the spatial labour-market disadvantage that explains why some depressed
regions have both a higher proportion of public employment in the first place (mean-
ing that these regions will be hardest hit by declining public spending) and higher rates
of IB claiming.
To conclude, the national policy response of supply-side labour-market interven-
tions, pursued by successive governments, remains blind to the distinctive geography of
IB receipt, and to the formidable labour-market and health obstacles to getting people
from IB into employment in certain parts of the UK. Without economic regeneration
with enhanced jobs growth and improvements in the health of the population in these
areas, it is difficult to see how the ESA reform can succeed. While the stringent WCA
may mean less people are on IB/ESA in the future, they may not be in employment
either.
4 Discussion and conclusions
4.1 The UK policy agenda on health and labour-market policyöfit for purpose?
In light of the evidence presented, are current and recent policies fit for purpose? What
additional measures are required? We summarise our analysis in table 1. Here we argue
that, to some extent, the ESA reform is backed by the evidence that previous IBs led to
unemployment being hidden as sickness. The ESA no longer produces a claimant
population that c`onflates two groups' (Beatty and Fothergill, 2005) of those who are
`ill but potentially able to work' and permanently severely disabled people. However,
the new system instead diverts the vast majority to job-seeking activities under the JSA
or work-related activity under ESA. In both cases, benefit rates are considerably lower
than under previous schemes (increasing the risk of poverty) while claimants continue
to face a complex range of health and employability-related barriers to work. It is not
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Table 1. Fit for purpose? The UK health, employability, and labour-market policy agenda.







Restrict access to long-term incapacity
benefits (IBs) to all but the most severely
ill/disabled. Establish short-term work-
related activity group (WRAG) subject
to compulsory activation and paid at
lower rate of benefit. Coalition proposes
means testing WRAG benefits after one
year.
Concentration of IBs in depressed
labour markets suggests problem of
unemployment hidden as sickness. ESA
reform will prevent those who would
given the right support and opportunities
from being diverted to long-term IB
claiming.
Majority now allocated to ESA work-
related group and Jobseeker’s Allowance
(JSA) paid at lower rates. This, and
proposed means-testing of WRAG,
will potentially increase risk of poverty.
Investment required in health/
employability interventions to support




More ‘‘accurate, robust and fair test
of capability’’ focusing on ‘‘aspirations
for returning to work’’ (DWP, 2007,
page 65). Resulted in majority of new
claimants being directed to JSA or work-
related activity. Coalition government
committed to reassessing all IB claimants
under WCA.
Most IB claimants report health
problems as key barrier to work and will
still require support. Pathways to Work
(PtW) evaluation suggest WCA-type
assessments can be counterproductive
if deployed too early—those assessed
as ‘fit’ can struggle to sustain progress
when diverted from IBs to JSA.
Despite findings of more strict
assessment, many claimants face
health problems and will require both
condition-management services and/or
in-work support. Evidence suggests that




Requires (and supports) claimants to
focus on what they are ‘able to do’
and plan for return to work. Increased
compulsory work-focused activity and
stronger sanctions proposed by coalition.
Many IB claimants would work given
support and opportunity. Participants in
PtW value support of Personal Advisers
despite compulsory nature of work-
focused interviews. Most job entries
from PtW directly from work-focused
interviews.
Potential value in helping claimants to
focus on progress towards work. Need to
maintain and develop Personal Adviser
services. Additional compulsion likely
to be ineffective/counterproductive in
labour markets with limited opportunities





























































































A ‘‘balanced package which aims
to target a number of health-related
personal and external barriers to
returning to work’’ (DWP, 2006,
page 28). Choices provides short, work-
focused support. Condition management
provides therapies to help cope with/
manage health conditions and alter
behaviours.
Strong evidence base that IB claimant
group relatively low-skilled, low-
qualified, and faces employability-related
barriers to work. Clear evidence that
health problems are a key barrier. Health
and employability interventions therefore
justified. Some positive health outcomes
from condition management for those
with mild/moderate conditions.
Given severity of skills gaps and
employability/related barriers faced by
some, longer term training and other
measures will be required. Condition-
management services in PtW have
reported some positive results, but
relatively few claimants are referred
to services. Health services need to
be expanded and more aggressively




for ESA and JSA claimants to be
amalgamated. ‘Work-for-dole’ proposal
may impose compulsory work activity
on long-term benefit claimants, based
on largely false assumptions that
dependency culture and eroded work
ethic are major barriers to work for
IB claimants.
Claimants face complex health and
employability barriers which require
tailored support. Little evidence of
dependency culture among claimants.
Impact of economic restructuring means
high levels of IB claiming is concentrated
in disadvantaged labour markets.
Simplified programme may not provide
sufficiently tailored support. Additional
compulsion will be counterproductive
if claimants not ready for work-related
activity. Like previous supply-side
initiatives, fails to address labour-market
factors explaining IB concentrations.
Fit for Work
in-work support
Ongoing pilots seek to engage workers
with health problems before they end up
on IB, offering: vocational rehabilitation;
health advice; and engagement with
employers on job design and adjustments.
Evidence supports the need for such
workplace-based initiatives. Hidden
sickness in the workforce often converts
to high IB rates in depressed labour
markets. Lack of support from employers
seen as barrier to work, and can impact
on sustainability of transitions.
Need for additional investment and
further development of in-work support
for those leaving IBs, and preventative
‘healthy workplace’ initiatives. Need
to engage employers as active partners,
encouraging job redesign/adjustments










































clear that the combination of compulsory work-focused interviews and short-term
employability interventions under PtW and its successor programmes will be adequate
for the task of assisting an increasingly large and complex group of claimants required
to engage in some form of activity. For example, while the more stringent WCA meets
its aim of reducing the on-flow to the main long-term incapacity benefit (now the ESA
`Support' element), those found fit for work or directed to work-related activity may
still have complex health needs. Feedback about the health outcomes delivered by PtW
condition-management services has been largely positive, but relatively few claimants
are currently referred to such provision; there needs to be substantial additional invest-
ment in, and support for, health-condition management if a larger claimant group with
more challenging health needs are to cope with work-related activity. Similarly, employ-
ability services have so far centred on the extensive use of compulsory work-focused
interviews to push those closest to the labour market to find employment. Given the
evidence on the range and complexity of the barriers faced by many IB claimants,
a strengthening of the current employability services (and more intensive support and
training) will be required.
Although the evidence points to a crucial spatial/labour-market effect explaining
concentrations of IB, there has been little progress in linking supply-side employability
policies to the strengthened economic development strategies that will inevitably be
required to deliver decent-quality jobs in areas where opportunities remain relatively
scarce. At this higher structural level, there is a substantial and fundamental mismatch
between evidence and policy: the evidence points to the importance of labour demand,
but the policy response focuses almost entirely on labour supply. Nor have policy
makers fully engaged with the broader role of employers in facilitating a return to
work for people with health problems. Yet the concept of `hidden sickness' (ill health
among those in work) is as important as is `hidden unemployment' to understanding
the IB problem. The Fit for Work pilots represent a potentially useful starting point in
engaging with employers and employees to promote health in the workplace, but this
agenda should be central to future strategies to reduce IB numbers.
The proposals of the coalition government formed in 2010, reflect a strong degree
of continuity with policies introduced since 2000 (Crisp et al, 2009). The Conservative
Party no longer explicitly promotes the idea that unemployment is a `` price worth
paying'' (Dorling, 2009, page 1091), and now acknowledges the importance of hidden
unemployment in understanding the IB problem (Cameron, 2008). Yet the policy
agenda of the government that it leads remains defined by a simplistic analysis of IB
claiming as a behavioural problem that can be addressed through a mix of work
incentives and compulsory activity alone. The evidence, in fact, suggests that many
people on IBs face complex barriers to participation. There is a danger that strength-
ened benefit sanctions will prove counterproductive if imposed upon those who need
long-term support, while any attempt to streamline existing initiatives under the Work
Programme must not neglect the need for the combination of health and employability
services required by disadvantaged IB claimants if they are to move towards employment.
An even more immediate concern is that the means testing of ESA after one year will
increase the risk of poverty faced by one of the most vulnerable groups in the labour
market. Finally, the 2010 coalition has shown little interest in how spatial labour-market
inequalities contribute to concentrations of IB claiming in disadvantaged areas. Indeed,
the rolling up of regional development policies and agencies, alongside swingeing cuts in
public finding, threaten to further embed the demand-related labour-market problems that
are crucial to explaining the UK's IB problem.
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4.2 New research challenges
Although previous research tells much about the causes of the IB problem and reveals
some key features of strategies likely to be successful in combating it, there remain a
number of important gaps in knowledge. First, the mechanisms by which people are
squeezed out of employment and onto IB are not fully understood; these mechanisms
may be both direct (for example, due to redundancy or the onset of illness) or indirect
(due to employers screening out job applicants with poor health). Second, there is a
need for research on the links between ill health and employment at the bottom end of
the labour marketöwhile there is a well documented association between good health
and employment across the population as a whole, there is less certainty about the
direction of causation, particularly for those in low-quality, manual occupations. Third,
research is needed into workplace occupational health cultures, policies, and practices
and employers' attitudes to hiring people with poor health and broken employment
records. Fourth, independent critical evaluation of the ESA regime needs to be carried
out, crucially examining what happens to those who are denied benefit because they
`fail' a WCA, rather than just monitoring outcomes for those `in the system'.
In meeting the challenge of this research agenda, there needs to be a greater meeting of
minds across different disciplines. On the one hand, economic analysts take the `rational'
individual as their unit of analysis in the context of labour supply, demand, wages, and
benefit levels. Social policy and public health analysts take the individual or the household
as the unit of analysis, interpreting benefit status as the result of the interaction of a range
of household characteristics, circumstances, and lifestyles. Regional labour-market
researchers tend to use spatial units of analysis, with employment and benefit outcomes
seen as the result of the balance between local job opportunities and the size of the
working-age population. All three of these perspectives bring important insights, but it
is difficult to see how any one on its own can provide a full explanationölet alone
offer a solutionöto the deep-seated IB problem in the UK. There needs to be a
renewed commitment to sharing expertise and intelligence. It is hoped that in this
paper we have highlighted the importance of bringing together theoretical perspectives
and methodological approaches from different disciplinesöchiefly economics, social
policy, public health, and geography. Together these can provide deeper insights into
complex multiscalar and interlinked systemic path-dependent processes.
4.3 Conclusionsöno turning back, but which way forward?
‘‘It once suited almost everyone to turn a blind eye to the scale of the issue. The
government liked IBs because they hid the true scale of joblessness, employers liked
them because they were freed from an obligation to take on workers in poor health,
and claimants liked them because, as long as they were going to be jobless, they
might as well be on the most generous benefit. The target reduction of one million
in the number of incapacity claimants by 2015 shatters this consensus.''
Beatty et al (2009, page 972)
Where once there was collective blindness among policy makers as to the scale of the IB
problem, there is now consensus on the need to develop policies to reduce the numbers
on benefits and to support claimants towards employment. The exposure of unemploy-
ment hidden as sickness as a key explanation of high IB numbers means that there is no
turning back for UK policy makers: future governments cannot `encourage' unem-
ployed people to disappear onto inactive benefits, as happened during the 1980s, or
completely ignore those with health problems while targeting more able job seekers who
are closer to the labour market. Policy makers also face pressure on welfare budgets and
the long-term challenge of activating an ageing labour force whose members will
inevitably need to cope with health issues in the workplace. However, if an effective
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and coherent policy agenda is to emerge in response to these challenges, then government
needs to consider the evidence on why large and increasing numbers of people have been
claiming IBs. Our analysis concludes that the IB problem is explained by a combination of
factors: labour-market inequalities mean that IB claiming has been concentrated in those
regions and localities most affected by economic restructuring and area-based disadvan-
tage; in these localities the most vulnerable find themselves at the back of a long queue for
a limited number of jobs; these vulnerable individuals were often ill when at work, and
continue to face health problems; and the same individuals are often among the lowest
skilled and least qualified people in the labour market.
Previous policies have largely ignored the spatial and labour-market factors at the
heart of the IB problem, while recent and proposed increases in compulsion appear to be
based on a dependency-culture thesis that is not supported by the evidence. Policy makers
have little chance of getting o`ne million off IB' unless they arrive at a more holistic range
of measures that link intensive support to build individuals' employability with area-
based regeneration strategies to promote accessible job opportunities. There is also a
need for a national commitment to occupational health, which engages with employers
to target sickness in the workplace and invests in condition-management services for
benefit claimants.
Current strategies are not fit for purpose. A new commitment to evidence-based
policy is required, coupled with a greater openness in government to a variety of
explanations of the nature of the IB problem and its potential solutions, rather than
a reliance solely on the evaluation of a narrow set of supply-side interventions. A fair
reading of the evidence demands investment in policies that tackle inequalities in
health, employability, and labour-market opportunitiesöthe interconnected challenges
that define the UK's IB problem.
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